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FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW OF STATE COURT
CONVICTIONS: INCOHERENT LAW BUT AN
ESSENTIAL RIGHT
Lynn Adelman*
I thank the editors of the Maine Law Review for the opportunity to participate
in a discussion about the present state of post-conviction review of criminal
convictions. This discussion is important and timely both because the quality of
the procedures by which state prisoners can obtain post-conviction review varies
greatly from state to state and because state prisoners who seek federal court
review of their constitutional claims by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus face
many obstacles. As a federal district judge, my experience is primarily with the
latter problem. Thus, in this article, I will offer a few comments about federal
habeas corpus as it applies to prisoners who are in state custody as the result of a
criminal conviction. Because I sit in Wisconsin which, like Maine, is one of those
enlightened states that does not have a death penalty, my experience with habeas
corpus is limited to non-capital cases, and, for that reason, I will focus primarily on
such cases.
The writ of habeas corpus, long known as the Great Writ or the Great Writ of
Liberty, has been available since the Magna Carta as a means by which a prisoner
can challenge the legality of his custody.1 In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
conferred habeas jurisdiction on the newly created lower federal courts.2 And in
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Congress extended the benefits of the writ to
prisoners in state custody.3 The reason that federal courts are authorized to review
the federal constitutional claims of state prisoners is not that federal courts are
better than state courts but because, for a variety of reasons, they are institutionally
better situated to address such claims. Federal court review of state court
convictions serves several important functions. First, when state courts address the
merits of a federal constitutional claim, federal courts must determine whether they
did so correctly.4 Second, when state courts do not address the merits of a federal
constitutional claim, federal courts must ensure that they have a sufficient reason
for not doing so.5 Thus, just as federal law is supreme, so is federal adjudication of
that law as mandated by Congress.6

* United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Judge Adelman thanks his
law clerk, Jon Deitrich, and courthouse librarian, Barbara Fritschel, for their assistance with this article.
1. See Lynn Adelman, The Great Writ Diminished, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 3, 3 (2009).
2. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2.4(d)(i), at 49 (6th ed. 2011).
3. Id. at 53.
4. Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 541, 542 (2006).
5. Id.
6. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 2, at 91.
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Although federal courts have always granted writs of habeas corpus sparingly,
in modern times, they granted them less infrequently in the 1950s and 1960s.7 In
that period, the Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to require states to provide criminal defendants with
various procedural rights. For example, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court held that
defendants had the right to have items seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
excluded from evidence.8 And, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held that
defendants who were in custody were entitled to warnings before being
interrogated by the police, and if they did not receive warnings, their responses
could not be admitted in evidence.9 Many law enforcement officials, among
others, were less than enthusiastic about these decisions, and state court judges
sometimes did a poor job of enforcing them. In order to insure that the new rules
of constitutional criminal procedure that it had developed were enforced, the
Supreme Court removed some of the obstacles faced by state prisoners who wished
to bring their federal constitutional claims before federal courts by petitioning for a
writ of habeas corpus.
In Brown v. Allen, the Court made clear that state prisoners could bring
constitutional challenges to their convictions in federal habeas proceedings even
though state courts had rejected such challenges in full and fair proceedings.10
Subsequently, the Supreme Court authorized federal habeas courts to review claims
that state prisoners had not previously presented to state courts.11 The Court also
allowed state prisoners to develop a factual record in federal habeas proceedings12
and to file more than a single petition challenging a state court conviction.13 In
combination with the expansion of state defendants’ constitutional criminal
procedure rights, the Court’s habeas jurisprudence made federal habeas corpus a
viable means by which state prisoners could challenge the legality of their
custody.14
In 1968, however, Richard Nixon was elected President, and things began to
change. The era of the Warren Court came to an end, and an ever more
conservative Supreme Court, first led by Warren Burger and later by William
Rehnquist, came up with a variety of ways to limit federal habeas review of the
constitutional claims of state prisoners. Rehnquist played a major role in this
process. From his days as a Supreme Court law clerk, he viewed habeas corpus not
as a mechanism for vindicating federal constitutional rights but as an improper
federal intrusion into state criminal justice systems and as a tool by which criminals
could prevent their punishment from becoming final.15

7. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Non-Capital Habeas:
A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 440 (2011).
8. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
9. 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966).
10. 344 U.S. 443, 462-63 (1953).
11. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
12. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
13. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 6 (1963).
14. Blume et al., supra note 7, at 440.
15. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 264-65 (2006).
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First, the Court prohibited habeas courts from reviewing virtually all claims
raising Fourth Amendment issues.16 It also barred consideration of most claims
that petitioners had not properly raised in state court.17 It expanded the
circumstances under which federal courts had to presume that state courts had
found the facts correctly.18 It barred federal courts from considering habeas
petitions which contained some claims that had been exhausted in state court and
some that had not, so-called mixed petitions.19 It generally prohibited federal
courts from granting relief to habeas petitioners based on a new rule.20 And it
declared that any rule was new if at the time a petitioner’s conviction and sentence
became final on direct review, a state court might reasonably have determined his
claim adversely.21 The Court prohibited consideration of so-called second or
subsequent petitions absent exceptional situations.22 It limited the circumstances
under which federal courts could conduct an evidentiary hearing,23 and it required
federal courts to employ a stringent harmless error standard when determining
whether a state prisoner was entitled to a writ.24 In sum, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts created numerous procedural obstacles for habeas petitioners to navigate,
and it substantially narrowed the substantive grounds on which federal courts could
grant relief.
It has never been entirely clear why the Burger and Rehnquist Courts (as well
as their successor, the Roberts Court, which has continued down the same welltrodden anti-habeas path) were so hostile to the idea that federal courts should be
able to vindicate the constitutional rights of state prisoners. Possibly, they were
sincerely motivated by concerns about federalism. However, it is hard to
understand how federalism can legitimately trump the claim of a prisoner whose
confinement is based on the deprivation of a constitutional right. Possibly, they
were concerned about efficiency and regarded requiring federal courts to spend
time addressing the habeas petitions of state prisoners as a wasteful use of judicial
resources. But, in truth, while some federal courts are overburdened, most are not,
and addressing habeas petitions is not particularly onerous. Another possibility is
that a majority of the Courts’ members shared the law and order and pro death
penalty views that have been so prominent in the last four decades. Again,
however, the only petitioners who are granted writs are those who have been
imprisoned because of the violation of a constitutional right.
In any case, for justices like Rehnquist, ideas about federalism, judicial
efficiency, and criminal justice added up to a strong antipathy to habeas corpus.
This antipathy included a distinct lack of sympathy for the constitutional rights that
prisoners were asserting as well as hostility to the fact that the creation of such

16. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
17. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977).
18. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 469 (1981).
19. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-20 (1982).
20. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989) (holding by plurality that a rule should not be applied
retroactively to cases on collateral review).
21. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1997).
22. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
23. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
24. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993).
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rights was part of a broad movement aimed at establishing a less harsh and more
egalitarian society. In a word, the responses of the majorities of the Burger,
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts to the habeas jurisprudence of the Warren Court
was, and is, reactionary.
Many members of Congress, mostly Republicans but also some Democrats,
responded to the habeas jurisprudence of the Warren Court, like the later Supreme
Court majorities, and supported bills to restrict federal habeas corpus review.25 In
large part, their purpose was to prevent prisoners who had been sentenced to death
from using the writ to avoid or postpone execution.26 Initially, the legislative
initiatives were focused on procedure, but as time went on, the bills included
restrictions on the substance of federal court authority.27 Conservative critics
inveighed against federal judges being able to “substitute their judgments about
federal rights for the contrary judgments of state courts (especially decisions about
the validity of death sentences).”28
However, even from a conservative perspective, because of the restrictions
imposed on federal courts by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, it was hard to make
a legitimate argument that restrictive legislation was necessary.29 Nevertheless, in
1994, when the Republicans sought control of the House of Representatives, they
made habeas corpus “reform” part of their so-called Contract with America.30 And
when, in 1995, Timothy McVeigh and others bombed the federal courthouse in
Oklahoma City, the Republicans, who by then had captured majorities in both
houses of Congress, seized the opportunity to enact legislation imposing additional
restrictions on habeas corpus.31 Congressional Republicans drafted a bill
containing a hodgepodge of limitations grabbed from a variety of proposals.32
However, they made no effort to discuss the policies included in the bill or the
specific language of the bill with habeas experts or with their Democratic
counterparts.33 They also refused to hold hearings on the bill, thereby preventing
anyone from commenting on it.34 In addition, they fast-tracked the bill onto the
floor of the House and Senate without an explanatory report.35 And, although the
bill had nothing to do with terrorism, its promoters named it the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Unsurprisingly, it passed with
large majorities.
Sadly, and over the objection of habeas scholars, civil libertarians, and others,
President Clinton signed the bill. One would have hoped that Clinton, who had
previously taught constitutional law, would have been loath to sign such a poorly
drafted bill, much less weaken the Great Writ of Liberty. He could have vetoed the
bill with limited political cost. For all its importance to prisoners who have been
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Yackle, supra note 4, at 543.
Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 544-45.
Larry Yackle, AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 FED. SENT’G. REP. 329-30 (2012)..
Id.
Id..
Id..
Yackle, supra note 4, at 546.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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deprived of constitutional rights, habeas corpus is an obscure subject in which the
general public has little interest. However, crime is always unpopular, and Clinton
was no stranger to anti-crime politics, having gone out of his way on a number of
occasions to show people that he supported the death penalty. And, of course,
habeas corpus had no politically significant constituency. Thus, a bad bill became
the law of the land.
The AEDPA was advertised as legislation designed to reduce the number of
successful habeas challenges in death penalty cases and to speed up the
adjudication of those challenges.36 However, the law included provisions unrelated
either to the death penalty or to procedural delay. It made substantive and
procedural changes in addition to changes applicable to non-capital as well as
capital cases. The AEDPA contained the following major provisions: a one-year
limitations period for state prisoners seeking habeas relief; a new limitation on
relief requiring that a prisoner demonstrate not only that the state court made a
harmful constitutional error but also that the court’s decision was contrary to or
unreasonably applied a decision of the Supreme Court or was factually
unreasonable; a more restrictive rule on the availability of fact development; and a
virtual prohibition on second or successive applications for habeas relief.37
The most objectionable provisions of the statute are those requiring federal
habeas courts to defer to erroneous but “reasonable” state court interpretations of
federal constitutional law and barring them from granting relief based on any
authority other than “clearly established” Supreme Court precedent.38 The former
provision prevents federal courts from ordering new trials for some prisoners
whose convictions were obtained through unconstitutional means.39 It also requires
federal courts to focus on the wisdom, or lack thereof, of a state court’s decision
rather than on the lawfulness of a prisoner’s custody, the traditional concern of
habeas corpus.40 The latter provision bars habeas courts from relying on circuit
court decisions or on their own understanding of constitutional jurisprudence, and
by doing so thwarts the development of constitutional law.41
By enacting the AEDPA on top of two decades of restrictive Supreme Court
decisions, Congress in many respects made habeas law incoherent.42 And the
Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the AEDPA have only made matters
worse.43 The Court has made no attempt to arrive at an interpretation of the statute
which makes sense from a policy standpoint.44 It has insisted that every provision
of the statute be read to alter habeas law in some way even though it is unlikely that
the drafters intended that result.45 Also, the changes that the Court has found have

36. See Adelman, supra note 1, at 15 (citing 141 CONG. REC. S7651, 7658-59 (daily ed. June 5,
1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
37. See Blume et al., supra note 7, at 442. See also Adelman, supra note 1, at 15.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
39. Adelman, supra note 1, at 15.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 18-19.
42. Yackle, supra note 28, at 329-30, 333.
43. Id. at 329.
44. Id. at 329-30.
45. Id. at 330.
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generally been harmful to state prisoners seeking habeas relief.46 Thus, together
the Supreme Court and Congress have made it much more difficult for state
prisoners to use habeas corpus to obtain relief for violations of federal
constitutional rights. As a result, in non-capital habeas cases, a very small
percentage of the petitions filed are granted.47 This fact has led two scholars,
Nancy J. King and Joseph L. Hoffmann, to advocate that, with a few exceptions,
federal habeas review in non-capital cases be eliminated altogether.48 Hoffmann
and King argue that federal habeas review in non-capital cases was necessary in the
1960s but that state post-conviction review procedures have improved since then
such that today habeas review is largely superfluous.49 They also argue that federal
habeas review of non-capital cases does not result in meaningful benefits and costs
more than it is worth.50
The reaction to the Hoffmann/King proposal has been largely negative.51
However, the mess that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts and Congress have made
of habeas law has caused other habeas scholars to advocate various changes in
federal habeas review. One scholar has suggested reconfiguring federal habeas to
focus on systemic state violations, defined as violations which recur in a pattern
across multiple cases.52 Another argues that federal habeas review should focus
not on the result of the claims of individual prisoners but on the fairness of the
post-conviction procedures that states used to resolve the claims.53 A third
contends that habeas procedures should be changed to enable juries to play a role in
the adjudication of claims.54 In addition, the American Bar Association has
established a Task Force on Post-Conviction Remedies, which is preparing revised
standards to guide future reform efforts. The Task Force’s reporter, also a habeas
scholar, while understandably concerned about the present state of habeas review,
believes that “at some point, professionals will surely draw back, take stock, and
46. Id.
47. See generally NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN, II, & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS
CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
OF 1996, at 7 (2007).
48. See NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS CORPUS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 91 (2011).
49. Id. at 106-107.
50. Id. at 99, 106-107.
51. See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 7; Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather
Than the Result, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Eve Brensike Primus, A Crisis in Federal
Habeas Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Larry Yackle, Untangling the Twists of Habeas
Corpus, JUDICATURE, Sept-Oct. 2011, at 90. See also Ronald L. Kuby, Lamar W. Hankins, James E.
Coleman, Jr., Stephen J. Fartunato, Jr., & Bob Davidow, Letter to the Editor, A System for Courts to
Redress Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011; Douglas A. Berman, Important New Book Urges “More
Prudent Use of Habeas in State Criminal Cases,” SENTENCING L. & POL’Y (Apr. 17, 2011),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2011/04/important-new-book-urges-moreprudent-use-of-habeas-in-state-criminal-cases.html; Andrea Lyon, Liberty Requires More Habeas in
This Corpus, HUFF POST, Apr. 24, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-lyon/liberty-requiresmore-hab_b_853020.html .
52. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010).
53. Marceau, supra note 51.
54. Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framers’ Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury Involvement in
Habeas Adjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 887, 889 (2010).
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set about reconstructing federal habeas corpus in a sensible, coherent form.”55
In thinking about what, if anything, can be done, it is important to remember
that as badly as the Supreme Court and Congress have treated federal habeas
corpus, they have by no means totally dismantled it. Federal habeas review
continues to present state prisoners with an opportunity to vindicate federal
constitutional rights of which they have been deprived. To take advantage of this
opportunity, a prisoner must have a strong substantive claim, navigate a difficult
procedural path (or have a lawyer who can do so), and be fortunate enough to have
his petition assigned to a judge who is sensitive to the types of issues raised by
habeas petitioners. Obviously, there are many contingencies, but petitioners can
prevail. And those who do will either receive a new trial at which their
constitutional rights will be respected, a more favorable disposition of the charges
against them, or outright release. Although it would be wonderful if Congress or
the Supreme Court would make federal habeas review more coherent and less
unfair than it presently is, our focus in the meantime should be on preserving it and
making it work as well as possible.
The Hoffmann/King proposal that federal habeas review in non-capital cases
be almost completely eliminated is highly objectionable. It is also somewhat
dangerous because the fact that it has not been well-received is no guarantee that
one or more legislators, eager to appear tough on crime, will not decide to promote
it. And we know from the AEDPA and other experiences that in the legislative
process almost anything can happen. As stated, Hoffmann and King base their
argument on the premise that unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, state courts now fully
protect criminal defendants against the deprivation of federal constitutional rights.
For a variety of reasons, this premise is deeply flawed.
First, although all states offer some form of direct and collateral review of noncapital convictions, the quality of such review varies significantly. In many states,
“meaningful access to state review procedures—particularly state post-conviction
review—is . . . difficult to come by.”56 In some states, it is very hard for criminal
defendants to bring ineffective assistance of counsel claims.57 And prisoners who
file such challenges are often unable to do the necessary investigative work.58 But
aside from these issues, another problem exists which Hoffmann and King don’t
face up to, namely that, in important respects, state courts are not well positioned to
be able to consistently enforce the federal constitutional rights of criminal
defendants.
Second, whereas federal judges have life tenure, in most states, judges are
elected or subject to appointment or reappointment by officials who themselves are
subject to election.59 For a prisoner claiming the deprivation of a constitutional
procedural right, there is a substantial difference between having the claim heard
by a judge or judges with life tenure and a judge or judges who must be re-elected
or re-appointed. This problem has only gotten worse as judicial elections are
55. Yackle, supra note 28, at 333.
56. Blume et al., supra note 7, at 444.
57. Primus, supra note 51, at 8.
58. See Blume et al., supra note 7, at 444-45.
59. See, e.g., Margaret Tarkington, Attorney Speech and the Right to an Impartial Adjudicator, 30
REV. LITIG. 849, 852 n.5 (2011) (discussing methods of judicial selection).
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increasingly contested; increasingly involve substantial spending, both by the
candidates’ campaigns and by independent special interest groups; and increasingly
result in the defeat of incumbents.60 Judges are well aware that decisions which
favor criminal defendants can easily be exploited in elections. With enough
money, it is not difficult to create an impression that a judge is soft on crime, and
such an impression can be fatal to a judge’s re-election prospects.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that fear of defeat at the polls or of
engendering opposition to reappointment affects judicial behavior.61 In the years
after three California Supreme Court justices were ousted for refusing to uphold
death sentences, the California Supreme Court upheld such sentences at a very high
rate.62 Moreover, studies indicate that judges decide criminal cases differently as
they get closer to an election. Pennsylvania sentencing judges, for example,
became significantly more punitive the closer they came to standing for reelection.63 This was so even though they served ten-year terms and faced nonpartisan retention elections.64 Judges, like other political figures, “have a tendency
to vote in accordance with perceived constituency preferences on visible issues
simply because the failure to do so is politically dangerous.”65 Moreover, judges
who campaign on “law and order” platforms are likely to keep their campaign
promises once they are on the bench. A criminal defendant faced with a judge who
was elected after a tough-on-crime campaign faces an uphill fight. My home state
of Wisconsin provides an example of this problem. In 2008, with some three
million dollars worth of help from a special interest group, Wisconsin
Manufacturers and Commerce, a little known trial court judge, and former
prosecutor, Michael Gableman, ousted an incumbent state supreme court justice by
contrasting his own law-and-order philosophy with the incumbent’s supposedly
soft-on-crime views. Gableman ran a television ad representing that he had
“committed his life to locking up criminals to keep families safe, putting child
molesters behind bars for over 100 years.”66 Given this kind of campaign, it is
unsurprising that Justice Gableman almost never votes in favor of a criminal
defendant. As a result of the statements made in his campaign, defense lawyers
have asked Gableman to recuse himself in criminal cases on grounds of bias.
These requests were, of course, denied.67 It is not an exaggeration to say that the
manner in which Gableman secured his seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court is a
powerful argument in favor of federal habeas review.
A court made up of elected judges can have difficulty with a high profile
60. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 628,
640 (2009).
61. See, e.g., id. at 683-84.
62. See Kenneth J. Aulet, It’s Not Who Hires You but Who Can Fire You: The Case Against
Retention Elections, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 589, 608-609 (2011).
63. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind
when It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 261 (2004).
64. Id.
65. Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the American
States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 489 (1995).
66. Symposium, State Judicial Independence—A National Concern: Session 1: One Symptom of a
Serious Problem: Caperton v. Massey, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569, 573 (2010).
67. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2010).
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criminal case, no matter how impartial and well-intentioned its members.
Consider, for example, the case of Ted Oswald, who was convicted of the murder
of a police officer and other crimes in a conservative, suburban Wisconsin
county.68 Because the case was highly publicized, the judge sequestered
prospective jurors in a jury room while he and the lawyers questioned them one by
one in the courtroom.69 On the fourth day of voir dire, a prospective juror testified
that throughout the voir dire several prospective jurors in the jury room had been
telling the others that the defendant was guilty and that a trial would be a waste of
time and money.70 In addition, another prospective juror wrote a letter to the judge
stating that if he were selected as a juror, he would not give the trial the attention it
deserved and might vote either way just to get it over with.71
The defendant’s lawyer asked to question the prospective jurors about the
impact of the jury room statements and the author of the letter about his ability to
be impartial, and the judge denied both requests.72 It is difficult to understand this
ruling apart from the notoriety of the case. Voir dire had already consumed four
days, and the judge likely feared that more questioning would result in the loss of
the entire jury pool. Neither the expense of empaneling a new pool nor delaying
the case would have gone over well with county voters. The case’s high profile
likely also affected the appellate courts. Both the state court of appeals and the
state supreme court attempted to avoid deciding the case, the former by certifying it
to the supreme court, and the latter by declining to accept the certification.73 After
a long delay, the court of appeals ultimately affirmed the conviction and the state
supreme court declined further review.74 After I granted Oswald’s habeas petition
(even with life tenure, some decisions cause trepidation), the Seventh Circuit
affirmed noting that there was a “high probability that some, maybe all, of the
jurors who tried Oswald were biased.”75
Thus, unfortunately, politics and money play a role in the outcome of some
criminal cases. For this reason alone, the Hoffmann/King argument that state
courts sufficiently protect the federal constitutional rights of criminal defendants is
unrealistic. Even with the difficult AEDPA standard, many defendants likely have
a better chance before a life-tenured federal judge than they have in a state court.
This, of course, was the reason that the framers of the Constitution provided federal
judges with life tenure and that Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.
For other reasons too, state courts are not well positioned to decide the
constitutional claims of state prisoners. State court judges receive less training in
federal constitutional law than their federal counterparts and face federal
constitutional issues less often. Federal judges receive a great deal of education
about such issues both when they take the bench and on an ongoing basis. For
68. See Oswald v. Bertrand, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1082 (E.D. Wis. 2003), aff’d, 374 F.3d 475 (7th
Cir. 2004).
69. Id. at 1083.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1086.
72. Id. at 1085.
73. Id. at 1082.
74. Id.
75. Oswald, 374 F.3d at 480.
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example, they regularly attend workshops about the past term’s Supreme Court
decisions. They also have two to four law clerks who are usually among the
brightest members of their law school classes. State court judges receive less
training, have less staff, and often have to face long daily calendars.
The Hoffmann/King assertion that federal habeas review does not result in
meaningful benefits is also mistaken. In some cases, federal habeas courts correct
state court errors. Federal habeas review also provides an incentive to state courts
to vindicate federal constitutional rights. No court likes to see its decisions vacated
by another tribunal. If federal review were eliminated, state courts would likely not
perform as well.76 Also, federal habeas review sometimes creates a dialogue
between state and federal courts. Federal habeas decisions can illuminate federal
constitutional issues to which state courts may not be attuned. I have written
elsewhere about how a case I decided, which dealt with a defendant’s constitutional
right to a public trial, had this effect.77
Although the previously mentioned ideas of other scholars regarding possible
changes in habeas review are interesting, none are compelling. Like Professors
Blume, Johnson, and Weyble, I disagree with the notion that habeas corpus is or
should be a mechanism for addressing broad governmental problems. Habeas is
and should be a remedy for individuals who are wrongfully imprisoned. The fact
that the Supreme Court and Congress have made it less effective (hopefully
temporarily) does not mean that we need to find new functions for the writ to serve.
The problem with habeas corpus is that it is too hard for prisoners who have been
deprived of constitutional rights to obtain relief. The procedures are too
complicated, and courts sometimes cannot grant relief to deserving applicants. An
ideal habeas corpus would look pretty much like it did before the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts and Congress messed it up. And while real reform might not be
imminent, our immediate task is to educate the public, the bar, the judiciary and
Congress.

76. Blume et al., supra note 7, at 453.
77. Adelman, supra note 1, at 29.

